by Sanaa Marsini
The 25 July 2021 was a watershed in the history of democracy in Tunisia, not just because it coincided with Republic Day celebrations, but it was also the day on which the president announced a set of extraordinary measures within the framework of activating article 80 of the constitution.
President Kais Saied considered that the country was passing through a phase of imminent danger and that it was impossible for state institutions to proceed normally. That day, Saied suspended parliament, sacked the prime minister and consolidated control over the government and the parliament.
Such measures were met with significant popular support, especially because on 25 July there were mass protests in different locations calling for change and accountability and demanding a fight against corruption and those that are implicated in it.
At the same time, they were extraordinary measures that divided the people and its elites, intellectuals, and constitutional experts into those who supported them and those who opposed them or expressed reservation. After announcing these measures, Saied announced a legislative initiative which acknowledges a punitive settlement with several businessmen.
This recalled, quite forcefully, the July 2015 initiative of the late President Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi, of reconciliation in both economic and financial sectors. The initiative was widely denounced at the time by rights organisations and parliamentary blocs, who considered it an attempt on the part of the president to whitewash corruption and reinforce impunity.
Others considered that this project would be contrary to Tunisia's international obligations in the field of fighting corruption and that it would therefore have negative consequences on the political reforms that were supposed to be undertaken.
Some may ask: What's so new about the president's initiative for it to represent progress or difference compared to what was previously proposed? In fact, answering this question does not require much research. By focusing on the text of both projects we realise that there are no essential differences between the two projects, and that to the contrary, they each resemble the other.
Both bills have the same objective, namely putting in place mechanisms to encourage investment and uplifting the national economy through the adoption of measures pertaining to issues of financial corruption.
The same would apply to those who stand to benefit from these mechanisms. They are the individuals indicted or suspected in cases of financial corruption and the squandering of public funds (chapter two of both bills).
Both bills are based on the mechanism of settlement, which is an essential mechanism in the process of economic reconciliation or punitive settlement, which happens to be under the supervision of a settlement or reconciliation committee.
This committee exists for both bills, though with relatively varying composition and different supervision. In the economic reconciliation bill, the process would be supervised by the prime minister's office whereas in the punitive settlement bill, it would be under the supervision of the president himself.
As for the essence of the settlement, it is almost the same in both initiatives and would take place in the form of paying a sum of money equivalent to the sum embezzled or the benefit achieved plus five per cent for each year from the date when this happened.
This is almost the same essence with a very simple variation that has to do with the added percentage, which is 10 per cent in the case of the punitive settlement bill, as well as the possibility of accomplishing a project, or projects, relating to public interest whose cost is covered by the settlement.
The two projects comprise articles that relate to how to dispense of the money collected. It is almost the same mechanism with slight variations. In the economic reconciliation bill, the collected money from implementing the settlement agreements would be deposited in the savings and trusts fund, which is under the supervision of the accountings court.
However, in the punitive settlement bill, a special fund would be created for this purpose under the supervision of the president. The two projects concur in that those sums of money would be allocated for regional development, providing infrastructural support, and promoting investment.
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Both projects also concur in that settlement should lead to ending public legal proceedings and halting the trial or dropping penalties. A certificate to this effect would be handed over to the state's general prosecutor at the perusal tribunal or to the general prosecutors at the appeal courts.
Researching the meeting points and those of resemblance between the two bills is important for two reasons. The first reason is to show that what the president is proposing and considering to be necessary to resolve the question of the corrupt businessmen and pump money into state coffers is an identical copy of what President Mohamed Beji Caid Essebsi, may God bless his soul, proposed and was at the time considered to be a whitewash for corruption.
The second reason, which is the more important one, is that what the president considers to be a response to popular demands about bringing to justice those who are corrupt and reclaiming public funds, is nothing more than a settlement bill that leads to abolishing punishment and consequently accountability.
Finally, we would say that what is being claimed by the supporters of the 25 July measures, and what the president considers to be a campaign against corruption and the corrupt, is nothing but slogans and a facade for accomplishing objectives that are so far away from fighting corruption. These objectives may be summed up in the accumulation of all powers in the grip of one person, undermining democratic and republican values, and negating the principle of the separation of powers and constitutional supremacy.
This content was published in Middle East Monitor on August 04, 2021.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of UMMnews.
